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Applied economic model for an innovation growth  
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                                            "Goce Delcev" University, Stip, R. Macedonia 
 
 
The issue of institutional support for innovations in Latin American countries has been 
examined in this paper. We use aprirori theoretical knowledge on this issue in order to derive 
one econometric model out of a theoretical framework. The influence on human capital 
variable on innovations growth it is straightforward. However, the sign on the institutions 
variable is ambiguous. Defective institutions in Latin American countries resulted in 
regional’s social conflicts which were severe, and the ability of social groups to use formal 
political institutions to resolve, or mitigate this conflicts has been much less effective. The 
lack of democracy if we may say, deteriorates the entrepreneurial spirit and hence institutions 
may as well turn not to be supportive of innovations.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper the issue of institutions support 
for innovations has been investigated on the 
panel of Latin American countries. In the 
macroeconomic literature there has been 
consensus made, that the long run growth is 
product primary of innovations. The 
economists are still trying to set up a 
standard theoretical framework for long run 
economic growth that will incorporate 
institutions and innovations, Sala-i-Martin, 
(2002)1; Huang and Xu, (1999)2. The 
fundamental importance of institutions for 
economic growth through their influence on 
innovations was long ago being recognized 
by the economist Joseph Schumpeter. New 
growth economists namely Romer, 19903; 
Grossman and Helpman.19914; and Aghion 
and Howit,19925; had made breakthroughs 
in endogenizing technological change. 
However, in this models institutions are 
taken as given, and there is little or no 
                                                          
1 Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X. (2002). “15 Years of New 
Growth Economics: What Have We Learnt?” Central 
Bank of Chile, Working Paper 172, 22p. 
2 Huang, Haizhou and Chenggang Xu (1999). 
“Institutions, Innovations and Growth,” American 
Economic Review, 89(2): 438-443. 
3 Romer, Paul,(1990) ,"Endogenous Technological 
Change." Journal of Political Economy, October 
1990, 98(5), pp. '71-102. 
4 Grossman, Gene and Helpman, Elhanan(1991). 
"Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth." Re-view 
of Economic Studies, January 1991, 58(1), pp. 43-61. 
5 Aghion, Philippe and Howitt, Peter.(1992) "A 
Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction." 
Econometrica, March 1992, 60(2), pp. 323-51. 
attempt in this models to explain what 
besides labor and capital, and knowledge 
accumulation drives innovation. However, 
Barro (1997)6, stated and found that political 
and economic institutions are some of the 
most important factors in explaining 
differences in growth per capita. Unlike neo-
classical economist, institutional economist 
tend to focus on institutions more. The 
influence of a institutions on the ability of 
one country to advance technologies is a 
central way that institutions affect economic 
performance. However, institutional 
economist have much more to do in order to 
include  technology and technological 
change explicitly in their change, Nelson, 
Nelson(2002)7.According to this two authors 
, Nelson et Nelson (2002), institutions are so 
called “social technologies”, this is in line 
with Thorsten Veblen’s view of institutions 
as “general habits of action and thought”. 
Now, from our pint of vie we show in the 
Table 1, with what percentage does 
technological diffusing products enter in the 
import of Latin American countries.  
                                                          
6 Barro, Robert,(1997), Determinants of economic 
growth: A cross-country empirical study. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1997. 
7 Nelson,R.,Nelson,K.,(2002), Technology, 
institutions, and innovation systems, Research Policy 
31 (2002) 265–272 
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 Table 1 Imports of technical progress-diffusing products as a percentage of industrial 
imports in Latin American countries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : ECLAC, on the basis of official 
figures.aExcluding oil imports. 
bMercosur = Southern Common Market. 
cCACM = Central American Market. 
 
As it can be seen from the Table Latin 
American countries are big importers of 
technical progress diffusing products, and 
that throughout time that trend is positive 
and the import of technology increase. 
Countries in the table are members of 
custom union Mercosur and supranational 
union CACM. Next, for institutions here as 
proxy variable we take ODA, or Official 
development assistance.Official 
development assistance are resource flows 
provided by bilateral sources and 
multilateral institutions with the objective of 
promoting the economic development and 
welfare of the recipient country.
 1965 1970 1980 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Mercosurband 
 an
d 
30.1 39.5 37.3 41.7 37.3 36.1 38.0 35.9 38.8 41.2 
Chile           
Argentina 24.0 34.9 38.0 35.1 35.3 38.0 39.8 38.8 38.2 39.1 
Brazil 34.7 43.0 40.5 45.1 43.3 36.4 39.0 36.3 41.7 44.4 
Chile 36.6 40.8 27.9 42.7 33.6 36.6 37.2 34.4 34.8 36.1 
Paraguay 31.2 32.3 30.1 24.6 25.8 26.4 26.9 24.0 26.6 
Uruguay 24.1 29.7 29.0 29.7 24.2 24.8 24.4 27.2 29.0 29.7 
Andean Community 36.6 38.3 35.0 38.4 35.6 36.3 34.4 34.0 36.5 37.5 
Bolivia 28.0 31.2 34.2 33.2 35.3 38.2 28.4 35.4 40.5 35.5 
Colombia 44.8 40.0 32.3 37.5 34.2 34.6 36.8 37.4 38.6 39.0 
Ecuador 32.2 33.3 39.3 37.3 34.0 37.4 27.7 30.1 31.5 32.7 
Peru 34.0 35.3 36.9 34.4 27.8 32.1 30.7 32.7 35.9 37.9 
Venezuela 36.6 40.1 34.9 41.6 38.9 38.9 37.4 31.9 35.2 ... 
Mexico  43.7 46.0 39.0 36.2 38.9 39.1 42.8 44.3 44.5 43.7 
CACMc 26.2 26.1 24.9 25.5 26.4 27.2 25.7 25.1 24.8 25.4 
Costa Rica 26.2 26.1 26.1 26.7 25.7 28.2 25.6 26.2 25.6 ... 
El Salvador 27.9 23.8 23.1 22.6 26.2 27.9 26.8 25.0 25.6 26.1 
Guatemala 25.8 25.3 21.8 26.7 271 26.5 23.0 22.1 24.2 25.8 
Honduras 21.3 26.1 31.6 24.2 24.5 23.4 26.0 26.9 20.9 22.4 
Nicaragua 28.9 29.5 22.0 24.5 29.0 30.8 31.6 28.5 29.6 28.1 
Total 34.8 39.1 36.2 37.8 37.1 36.9 38.7 37.7 39.9 41.2 
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Behind this altruistic intention, however, 
ODA has been used as an instrument of 
foreign policy of more developed countries 
to advance their political and commercial 
interests. Degree of dependency on aid: 
Where countries are heavily dependent on 
aid (measured as a proportion of government 
revenues, on a per capita basis or as a 
percent of GNI), governments remain 
vulnerable to sharp fluctuations in aid flows. 
In some cases, countries may not be 
especially dependent on aid, but certain 
sectors within a country may rely heavily on 
aid to function and thus are vulnerable (e.g., 
the health sector).About ODA and technical 
assistance, For instance, technical assistance 
(which represented 12.7 percent of ODA in 
2009) typically involves a contract between 
a donor agency and a consultant in its own 
country. The aid recipient receives a service 
(the consultancy report, training, etc.), but 
the valuation of the service is beyond its 
control and no cash transaction takes place 
with the developing country. On the other 
hand, volatility associated with this form of 
aid may be less problematic than that by 
which funds are channeled directly to 
recipient countries’ budgets, 
UNDP,(2011)8.So here we set hypothesis 
that institutions, affect growth of 
innovations positively in the case of Latin 
American countries. This variable together 
with the quantitative measure of human 
capital, which here we take youth literacy 
rate (between youth from 15-24 years), as 
proxy variable for human capital. Next, 
follows theoretical explanation and 
mathematical derivation of the econometric 
equation that we estimate. 
                                                          
8 UNDP,(2011), Towards human resilience: 
sustaining MDG progress in an age of economic 
uncertainty, CSE web net  
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2. From theoretical to econometric model: 
Institutional changes in the function of 
innovation 
The model is developed from Tebaldi and 
Elmsli (2008)9 , suggests that technology is 
related with organization and the quality of 
institutions. 
           )(AIZAHA A      (1)         
                                                
Where A  measures the technical knowledge 
, AH measured human capital engaged in 
research and development , Z marks the 
quality of institutions ( institutional structure 
) , which depends from I the sets of 
institutions , and from technology ( leading 
technology ) . Previous equation we can 
write the following expression: 
    
ZIAAHAA A)('                                                                                        
 ( 2 ) 
The solution of the previous expression if 
0IHA A , is given by the following 
expression: 
The result from the previous differential   
equation can be simplified : 
                                                          
9Тebaldi,E.,Elmslie,B.,(2008), Do institutions impact 
innovation?, Working paper 
IHA
Z
A
2
1

                       (3)                                                                               
 
This last expression has 16 solutions, where 
all values and variables may vary 1 . If 
institutional arrangements to improve, the 
quality of institutions will 
increase 0


I
Z
, also the assumption that 
improvements in technology make existing 
institutions relatively old. Which means, 
that 0







A
I
I
Z
A
Z
, to apply the 
previous expression for defining the quality 
of institutions, 
a
A
I
Z 





 ,or by re-
expression 
aaAIZ  , 
where 10  a . 
An alternative form of expression  
a
A
I
Z 





 is







 2
1
2
)arg(
2
)arg(
2


IA
ai
aa eAIZ .    (4) 
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If you integrate the indefinite integral we 
get: 
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According to the expression
aaAIZ  , 
the production function to produce new 
technologies represent the following 
expression: 
a
A
a IHAA  1
             (6)                                                                                                
 
 
The latter expression is contained the claim 
that institutions are necessary inputs for 
production innovations. Good institutions 
improve the diffusion of knowledge between 
researchers, assist the implementation of 
property rights, and assist in the registration 
of patents, which means that good 
institutions are expected to positively affect 
the technical innovations.   
Equation
a
A
a IHAA  1 is 
nonlinear differential equation of the first 
order and can to estimate but can be 
transformed as discrete differential equation: 
a
At
a
t
ttt
IHA
AAA
1
1
1
1



 

          (7)                                                             
In order, previous econometric equation to 
estimate can logarithm from both sides: 
tiiti
tAiit
uIA
HA
,31,2
1,10
)ln()ln(
)ln()ln(






                                                                         
(8)
This variable )ln( iI for institutional is a 
proxy variable because is not exists one 
single measure known for institutions. By 
Sala- I- Martin (2002)10 , institutions affect 
on the economic performance in the same 
                                                          
10Sala-i-Martin,X.,(2002), 15 years of new growth 
economics: what have we learnt?, Central Bank of 
Chile Working Papers 
way that technology affects the output, 
which means that the economy has been bad 
institutions is not effective because more 
inputs are required to produce the same 
amount of output. The bad institutions also 
reduce the incentive to invest in physical 
capital, human capital and technology. 
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Addition, the institutions provide some stability for firms with 
guiding their behavior , and reduce  intrinsic 
risk which in itself carry innovation. Koenen 
, Lopez (2009 )11.  Institutions are important 
factors that shape innovation processes and 
provide an explanation for the unequal 
distribution of innovation between countries 
and regions. Those institutions that shape 
innovation often the regulatory domain and 
in them include: codes of best practices, 
standards, products, and technologies. By 
Marx's view, the institutional structure of 
society is fundamentally conditioned by 
technology. Marks ( 1859 )12in his preface to 
the Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy , writes that a stage of 
development of the productive forces in 
society collide with property relations, and 
continue to be born after that social conflict , 
new relations of production , but not mature 
before the foundation of the existing society 
production relations. The new production 
relations mean new ways of producing, or a 
change in technology that will also change 
the relative performance of the institutional 
setting (plural of institutions) in the 
                                                          
11Coenen, L.,Lopez,F.,(2009),Comparing systems 
approaches to innovation and technological change 
for sustainable and competitive economies: an 
explorative study into conceptual commonalities, 
differences and complementarities,Lund university 
12Marx,K.,(1859),A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, On-Line Version: Marx.org 1993 
(Preface, 1993), Marxists.org 1999 
economy. The effect of institutional changes 
and related technological change can be 
analyzed in terms of their effects on 
transaction costs and on production. The 
change in technology can also affect 
transaction costs and may make it more 
operational institutional placement if 
previously inoperative, Lin (1989).13 
Transaction costs for managing the state are 
reduced if constituents have strict beliefs 
about the legitimacy of the ruler and the 
institutions placed on the principle of 
fairness. The establishment of private 
property requires the owner has the benefit 
drawn from these rights to be greater than 
the cost of excluding others from this 
property. When the cost of the property is 
high the ownership will be joint. According 
to Nelson (2002), the idea of innovation 
systems is an institutional concept par 
excellence .The idea that institutions have a 
central role in innovations system is leading 
in theorists of the idea for National 
innovation system (NIS). Such as Edquist 
and Johnson (1997)14, are defining that 
                                                          
13Lin,Yufi,J.(1989), An economic theory of 
institutional change: Induced and Imposed change, 
Cato Journal Vol.9,No.1 
14Edquist, C. and Johnson, B. (1997). ‘Institutions 
and organisations in systems of innovation’,in C. 
Edquist (ed.) Systems of Innovation: Technologies, 
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institutions are a set of habits, established 
practices that govern the relations and 
interactions between individuals and groups. 
As an example of the above mentioned are 
taken patent law of each state and norms 
affecting relations at universities and 
enterprises. In the literature on systems of 
innovation institutions are also known as 
"social technologies". Alone division of 
labor is called "physical technology", while 
the division of labor along the way the 
coordination is called "social technology", 
Nelson, Nelson (2002).15 The social 
technologies still seen as generally accepted 
ways of managing, Williamson (1985).16 
Usually, in literature for transaction costs, 
social technology provide a way for 
something to do with low transaction costs.  
The objective of innovation system in which 
central place have institutions is diffusion, 
adaption and use of innovations, Johnson 
(2001).17 This however, is more theoretical 
(analytical) objective, in practice agents in 
                                                                                       
Institutions and Organizations.London and 
Washington: Pinter/Cassell Academic 
15Nelson,K,Nelson,R.,(2002), Technology, 
institutions, and innovation systems, Research 
Policy 31 (2002) 
16Wiliamson, O.,(1985), TheEconomic institutions 
of capitalism Firms, Markets, Relational 
Contracting,Yale University 
17Johnson,A.,(2001), Functions in Innovation 
System Approaches, Department of Industrial 
Dynamics 
Chalmers University of Technology SE-412 96 
Göteborg 
innovation system increasingly driven by 
their objectives that not correspond with 
social objectives, par example such with the 
social wealth. Concept of institutions as that 
are defined as standard social technologies, 
is consistent with the concept of innovation 
systems. Institutions despite promote models 
of stable behavior of economic agents , 
reduce uncertainty , and encourage markets 
to provide information , and thus help create 
more efficient mechanisms of selection , the 
company level but also at the level of 
market. Successful examples in economic 
history describes institutional innovation in 
terms of reducing transaction costs , and 
how these innovations allow greater gains 
from trade also allow expansion markets , 
North(1990). Now, as an example of 
institutional change to take the 
democratization of a country.18Acemoglu 
(2013). Firstly, we assume that there is an 
undemocratic government, means power in 
the hands of the elite, but there are some 
people that can cause revolution. Which 
means that there is no limit for revolution.In 
                                                          
18 Different countries have different models of 
political development, for example many European 
countries were democratized in 19th century, while 
many Latin American countries became democratic 
but they did not succeed  to consolidate democracy in 
the course of 20th century, South Africa for example 
until the very end of Apartheid  faced persistent non-
democracy  and repression, same goes for Singapore 
which face non-democracy with limited repression, 
Acemoglu (2013), Authorized lectures. 
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the model there are two groups of citizens, elite and poor people.
Elite earns income
1y , while poor earn 
income
2y , and thus
21 yy  . Simplify the 
model assuming a standard population to be 
normalized to 1. The section of the 
population 2
1
1  s is poor which means 
most people are poor, the rest is elite. 
Middle income in the country is denoted 
with y , and here we assume that the share 
of income that accumulated by the rich is   
s
y
y



1
)1(2 
and s
yk
y 1           ( 9)                                                                                      
while also assume that s
yk
s
y



1
)1( 
, or 
that ks  , while we know 
that
21 yyy  .economy in this 
simplification only fiscal instruments are 
linear flat tax 0 and transfer taxT . Costs 
of taxation are a function of the tax rate , 
respectively yC )( . Here in the former case, 
the function C is increasing and convex. 
Because taxes are the only government 
revenue, the budget constraint is given as: 
 yCT )(                              (10)                                                                             
What does that yCyT )(  . Tax rate 
they prefer poor is given as: 
)('
1
2C
s
sk



                                  (11)                                                                                   
While the elite can avoid taxation and its 
normal point of being it is 0
1  . 
Individual utility is defined as the 
discounted value of income after taxation. 
 



0
00 1
t
i
t
ti yEU            (12)                                                                                  
In the previous expression t represents the 
discount factor, while   ity1 it is a tax 
after tax. In undemocratic environment 
policy govern agents who belong to the elite. 
The only impact on the poor is through de 
facto power revolution that is undeniable. If 
the revolution didn’t happen 
  ))((1
0
00 yCyEU tt
t
iti   


                                                          ( 13) 
Or the previous expression means that the 
total utility of agents is equal to the sum of 
the discounted value of the tax after tax, 
meaning that the remaining portion of 
consumption with total revenues of taxes 
then remain to fund government spending. If 
there is a revolution it will succeed but part 
of the productive capacity of the economy, 
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which help to produce new innovative 
products are forever destroyed. People after 
the revolution has taken all produced 
production so far, and the part   which 
every citizen gets to him after the revolution 
is given by the following expression: 
 
)1(
1
s
yr

 
                                       
(14)
                                                                                
 
The total revenue in the economy is given 
by the expression  y1 , and it is divided  
on )1( s  agents, r is part of , but after 
the revolution. Changes in the part who are 
received for they the economic agents  is a 
result of changes in the environment, but the 
elite that controls the government in the 
undemocratic environment, they can always 
modify policy and not to respect the promise 
of redistribution of revenue who they gave it 
to the people. Members of the elite 
determine the tax rate nt , this tax rate is 
applied to all people of the economy. 
Citizens decide whether to start a revolution 
or not, the revolution record with t  and 
t =0, if there is not revolution, t =1. If 
there is revolution the people will obtain the 
share of output  1 , in the future periods. 
Institutional disequilibrium can affect 
different individuals different. The political 
institutions seem to be reformed and 
replaced more frequent than traditionally 
assumed in many political studies, Colomer 
(2001).19The first ,change of the regime and 
democratization is a very common of the 
late 19th century onward, the second,  large 
change is in  the own democratic systems , 
which they include many changes in 
alternative systems at elections , third minor 
institutional reforms are very frequent , 
sometimes they are small changes which 
seem to regularly occurs , but sometimes 
they are large changes that affect the 
electoral strategies , party system , and the 
performance of the government. By the 
Lin(1989), success of the political 
entrepreneur  depends on his ability to 
separate the potential profits and to convince 
the  members  of society that the separate of 
output  is in conformity  ( in accordance 
with their principles ) , with their ideologies 
.Political entrepreneur will exert effort for  
establishing new rules, if he believes that the 
benefit from them for him  it will larger  
than real costs. Revenue for political 
entrepreneur does not have to be material, 
they can be social prestige and political 
support. In the literature of evolutionary 
                                                          
19Colomer,J.,(2001), Introduction disequilibrium 
institutions and pluralist democracy, Journal of  
Theoretical Politics, special issue on 'The Strategy of 
Institutional Change, 13. 3, 2001 
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economy, the authors in this area recognize 
the role of institutions and institutional 
structures in design and support the 
advanced technology, Nelson and Nelson 
(2002). And evolutionary economists are 
observe the institutions then self 
technological change . But institutions are 
not yet incorporated into the formal analysis 
of evolutionary economists. In contrast to, 
the institutional economists are focus only 
the institutions. Economists who use the " 
systems approach " in the economy, use the 
term technological system ,and defined as 
socially defined and system who design a 
society, which consists  of physical , 
organizational , scientific and legislative 
elements, Bath (2011) .20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20Bhat,B.,(2011),Institutional Change and 
Technology Adoption in the Electricity Distribution 
Networks of Andhra Pradesh, (India), Competition 
and regulation in network industries 
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3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA  
In this study we use Dynamic panel data 
estimation techniques and linear models, 
namely GMM type dynamic models, same as 
fixed and random effect panel regression, also 
we use GLS panel data model. In this paper 
we use panel data related to the countries in 
the sample. Because there is bound to 
heterogeneity in data for different countries, 
panel data estimation seems appropriate since 
it takes into account that heterogeneity, 
Gujaraty (2003)21. Panel data are also more 
informative data, they include more 
variability, less collinearity and more 
efficiency. Estimation of Random effects 
model by Generalized least squares is easy 
and routinely done by many econometric 
software packages.  The basic model is as 
follows: 
itiitkkitit uaxxy   ....110
                                                                     
(15) 
Previous equation becomes RE model when 
unobserved effect ia  is uncorrelated with 
all of the explanatory variables i.e. covariance 
is zero: 
                                                          
21Gujarati, Damodar N. (2003), Basic 
Econometrics. New York: McGraw-Hill 
knTt
axCov iitn
...2,1,,....2,1
0),(


         (16)                                                             
Now for the fixed effect if we have the 
following expression 
TtuXay ititiit ...2,1,1   , for each cross-
sectional unit average, this equation becomes, 
ititiit uXay  1 , here T
y
y
T
t
it
it

 1 , if 
we subtract two previous equations(in order 
to eliminate the unobserved time constant)22 
we get:  
ititit
iitiititit
uxy
uuxxyy


1
1 )(


                                                        
(17) 
So the fixed effects estimator is efficient 
when idiosyncratic errors are serially 
uncorrelated, and there is no assumption 
about the correlation between the unobserved 
effect ia  and the explanatory variables. 
Next, just to test for the robustness of the 
results we employ, Dynamic 
                                                          
22 Wooldridge, Jeffrey , (2002), Econometric 
Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT 
press 
 13 
 
panel data estimator namely Arelano/Bond 
GMM estimator23, the basic model with 
lagged dependent variables is : 
Ttuyay ititiit ...2,1,1                                                                                       
(18) 
In the previous equation residuals are 
assumed to follow normal distribution, i.e. 
),0(~, 2uitu  . Here 1ity depends positively 
on ia , this is easy to see when we are 
inspecting the model for t-1 period ; 
Ttuyay
ititiit
...2,1,
121
  
                                                                   (19) 
So there exist endogeneity problem and OLS 
and GLS, i.e. FE and RE are not consistent. 
But the Arelano/Bond GMM estimator is 
consistent. The moment conditions use the 
properties of the instruments,and the 
instruments in the GMM Arelano /Bond 
model are the differenced explanatory 
variables: 
                                                          
23Arellano, Manuel & Bond, Stephen, (1991), Some 
Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo 
Evidence and an Application to Employment 
Equations,Review of Economic Studies, Wiley 
Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 277-97, April. 
 
2;  my mit                                                                                                                     
(20)  
So that the instruments are uncorrelated with 
the future errors  itu  and 1itu  . So the 
increasing number of moment of conditions is 
Tt ...4,3  . GMM estimation is combined 
with RE and FE estimator because as 
T , estimates of the RE and FE model 
begin to converge.   
The data that were used in this study were 
collected from the World bank data site24. 
Variables that are used for the estimation of 
the model are shown in table 2. 
                                                          
24http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=royalty&
language=EN&format= 
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Name of the variable  Variable label 
Patents (proxy for technology) 
indicator for 
Science&TechnologyInfrastructure 
Innovation, intellectual property, inventions, Patent 
applications, Patent applications residents, patents, 
Technology, invention, Patent application, Patent 
applications resident, patent 
Literacy rate, youth total (% of 
people ages 15-24) (proxy for 
human capital) 
Development goals, Education, Education outcomes, goal 
2, Illiteracy, international goals, Literacy, MDGs, 
millennium goals, Target 2, young people, youth, Youth 
illiteracy, Youth literacy, development goal, dev goal, 
Education outcome, international goal, MDG, millennium 
goal 
Aid Effectiveness Economic 
Policy & Debt Official 
development assistance ODA 
(proxy for institutions) 
Net official development assistance (ODA) consists of 
disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of 
repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of 
the members of the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC 
countries to promote economic development and welfare in 
countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. 
It includes loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent 
(calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent). Data are in 
current U.S. dollars. 
 
 
4.Descriptive statistics of the model  
Next, what follows is the panel descriptive 
statistics of the three variables that are being 
used in the model.  
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the variables  
 
Variable 
Variable 
name  
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observation 
logA 
Logarithm 
of 
technology 
overall  39.07447 22.1278 1 79 N =94 
 
 between 16.83431 10.33333 60.61111 n =6 
 
 within   
 
18.1904 2.863942 80.86394 T-bar =15.67 
logH 
Logarithm 
of human 
capital 
overall  20.68293 11.60267 1 40 N =41 
 
 between 10.79168 5.333333 37.5 n =6 
 
 within   
 
6.860657 0.238482 32.34959 T-bar =6.83 
logI 
Logarithm 
of 
institutions 
overall  24.83929 19.01519 1 65 N =112 
 
 between 18.58029 6.105263 53.47368 n =6 
 
 within   
 
8.410199 -12.6607 58.47086 T-bar =18.667 
 
In the econometric part we use following 
equation: 
 
tiiti
tAiit
uIA
HA
,31,2
1,10
)ln()ln(
)ln()ln(






                     (21) 
 
In the previous equation )ln( itA is the 
growth of the technology variable, 
)ln( 1, tAiH  is the human capital variable 
lagged once, )ln( 1, tiA is the technology 
variable lagged once, while )ln( iI is the 
logarithm of the institutions (quality of 
institutions) variable. Given the title of this 
investigation, hence the following graph that 
shows the movement of the technological 
growth and the quality of institutions 
through the panel of countries. 
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Figure 1 Dynamic panel for the movement of the quality of institutions variable together 
with technological growth (patents growth) 
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From the Figure 1 we can see that the 
movement of the two variables (quality of 
institutions and technological growth) is not 
stationary. But the first difference of the 
variables is stationary. This statement we 
prove with Fisher panel unit root test. For 
paneldata, panel unit root tests have been 
proposed by Levin and Lin (1992), Im, 
Pesaran andShin (1997), Harris and Tzavalis 
(1999), Madala and Wu (1999), Choi 
(1999), Hadri (1999),and Levin, Lin and 
Chu (2002)25. 
                                                          
25Choi, I. (1999), “Unit Root Tests for Panel 
Data,”manuscript of Kookmin University, Korea. 
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Table 4. Fisher Test for panel unit root using an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (0 lags) 
Ho: unit root 
 
D.logA D.logH D.logI 
2  (10) ;
2  (12)  
;
2  (12)            
99.7920 
 
52.0591 159.3815 
P>
2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
From the above results from the test all of 
the variables are I(1), or it means they are 
stationary when first differenced.  
Figure 2 Combined table of graphs of 
first difference of the variables of interest 
(technology, institutions, and human 
capital) 
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From the above table can be seen that the 
three series in the six panels are stationary, 
i.e. they move around mean zero and they all 
have some variance.  
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5.Econometric estimation and results  
 
In this paper panel data set was used with 
112 observation for six panels. Namely, in 
our panel of countries enter: Brazil, 
Columbia, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, and 
Uruguay. This sample is consisted of the 
data for the mentioned Latin American 
countries. Results are presented in the 
following tables.  
 
Table 5 Dynamic panel data estimation GMM model 
Dynamic panel-data estimation 
Group variable: Code ,Time variable :year  
GrowthA  
Dependent variable technological 
growth  
Coefficient P>|z| 
llogh 
First lag of 
logarithm human 
capital )ln( 1, tAiH  
9.10E-06 0.058 
LlogA 
First lag of 
logarithm of 
technology )ln( 1, tiA  
0.060384 0.498 
logI 
Logarithm of 
institutions quality 
measure )ln( iI  
-0.73376 0.018 
Constant  Intercept  53.8001 0.000 
Wald  test 
2 (3) H0 :the joint null 
hypothesis is that the instruments are 
valid instruments 
9.85 0.0199 
Number of observations 86 
Number of groups 6 
Instruments for differenced equation 
        GMM-type: L(2/.).logA L(2/.).logH L(2/.).logI 
Instruments for level equation 
        Standard: Constant  
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Dynamic panel data models estimate the 
effects on some observed outcome of other 
variables of interest, which may be 
exogenous or potentially endogenous, 
conditional on both unobserved individual 
heterogeneity and one or more lags of the 
dependent variable. We may illustrate the 
principle by the simplest possible model that 
gives empirical form to Equation (1):  
yt = βxt + εt                        (22)                                                                                              
     
      
in which case, rearranging previous 
Equation  
 εt = (yt – βxt)                          (23)          (23) 
and, substituting into , 
E(εt, xt) = E [(yt – βxt), xt] = 0   
                                       (24)  
 
For estimation, the empirical moment 
equation is the sample counterpart to the 
middle term in Equation : 
        
 
         0ˆ1
1



T
i
ttt xxy
N
  
(25)       
In Equation (25), only ˆ  (the estimated 
value of β) is unknown and so may be 
derived analytically. Equation (25) is also 
the first-order condition for the minimisation 
of the least-squares criterion for deriving the 
OLS estimate of β. In this case, the GMM 
and OLS estimators are equivalent, because 
OLS is a particular estimation method 
within the broader class of GMM methods. 
However, OLS uses only as many moments 
as there are parameters to be estimated. In 
contrast, GMM estimation may use more 
moments than there are parameters to be 
estimated26. From the Table 4 we can 
observe that lagged Human capital variable 
is positively and statistically significantly 
associated with the growth of technology, p-
value is 0.058, but the coefficient itself is of 
very small size. While the coefficient on 
quality of institutions measured by the 
Official development assistance is negative 
and statistically significant, p-value is 0.018, 
                                                          
26StataCorp (2007) STATA Logitudinal/Panel Data 
Reference Manual: Release 10. College Station, 
Texas    StataPress.  
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and the coefficient is of size -0.73.This is 
perhaps not in line with the conventional 
wisdom, but the appriori knowledge that 
institutions influence positively on patents 
and protection of property rights works only 
for “good” institutions.But bad institutions 
as supposedly from this result the sample of 
Latin American countries have, influence 
bad on technology. Second, as it was said in 
the introduction Latin American countries 
are importers of technical progress diffusing 
products, as it can be seen from the Table 1 
that their imports up to 40% is consisted of 
technical progress diffusing products, that is 
also that they do not produce this but they 
are buying technology, also with the loans 
and grants from the multinational 
institutions (ODA proxy for quality of 
institutions), they are paying their imports of 
high tech products. While, the coefficient on 
the lagged technology is positive but 
insignificant when regressed with the 
technological growth. Next, for a robustness 
check we run Random effects Generalized 
least squares regression.  
Table 6 RE GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances 
RE GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances 
Group variable: Code ,Time variable :year  
GrowthA  
Dependent variable technological growth  
Coefficient P>|z| 
llogh 
First lag of logarithm 
human capital 
)ln( 1, tAiH  
7.91E-06 0.0106 
LlogA 
First lag of logarithm of 
technology )ln( 1, tiA  
0.070472 0.441 
logI 
Logarithm of institutions 
quality measure )ln( iI  
0.210005 0.0236 
Constant  Intercept 
34.8058 0.000 
Wald  test 
2 (3) H0 :the joint null hypothesis is 
that the instruments are valid instruments 
3.75 0.4410 
Estimated correlation coefficient  -0.03447467 
R-squared   0.9349 
Number of observations 86 
Number of groups 6 
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Generalized least squares (GLS) is a 
technique for estimating the unknown 
parameters in a linear regression model. The 
GLS is applied when the variances of the 
observations are unequal 
(heteroscedasticity), or when there is a 
certain degree of correlation between the 
observations. From the table it can be seen 
that the estimated correlation coefficient is 
low -0.034. Coefficient of determination is 
high 0.9349.Next, we do RE GLS regression 
but with a comparison by years. The 
coefficient on the institutions is positive 
0.0097 and statistically significant 0.0545 
Random-effects GLS regression                    
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Technological 
growth  
Coefficient  P>|z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Independent 
variable :Logarithm 
of institutions 
quality  
0.097497 0.0545 -0.21826 0.41325 
year 
1995 35.6592 0.029 3.644101 67.67429 
1996 15.73667 0.333 -16.1145 47.58785 
1997 11.48727 0.5 -21.9264 44.90098 
1998 -6.03935 0.71 -37.9279 25.84921 
1999 42.96065 0.008 11.0721 74.84921 
2000 24.17515 0.138 -7.7558 56.10609 
2001 5.785157 0.722 -26.0799 37.65026 
2002 -2.05384 0.899 -33.9151 29.80742 
2003 32.82916 0.043 0.976414 64.68191 
2004 -0.25384 0.988 -32.1151 31.60742 
2005 -0.83434 0.959 -32.6975 31.02877 
2006 21.56065 0.185 -10.3279 53.44921 
2007 18.53615 0.255 -13.386 50.45826 
2008 1.214145 0.941 -30.7261 33.15441 
2009 12.73615 0.434 -19.186 44.65826 
2010 17.27264 0.289 -14.6825 49.22783 
2011 25.42601 0.138 -8.13062 58.98263 
Constant 26.0259 0.052 -0.23802 52.28982 
R-squared 
0.9658 
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so from the previous table we can see that 
the highest marginal contribution of ODA to 
technological growth we have in 1999, this 
is also proven graphically on the following 
chart. 
 
Figure 3 Marginal contribution of ODA to technological growth 
 
 
But from the previous figure we can see that 
the overall marginal coefficient on the 
quality of institutions is negative, that means 
that overall contribution to innovations 
growth is negative. Coefficient of the 
determination is 15%. So, we have 
ambiguous relationship between quality of 
institutions and technological growth based 
on our results for the sample of Latin 
American countries.  
6. Conclusion  
So by investigating the link between 
institutions and innovations growth in Latin 
American countries, we confirm 
conventional wisdom about the sign of this 
relationship, which is supposed to be 
positive. This relationship is robust, but in 
the first model (DPD) model, this sign is 
negative with size -0.73 and p-value 0.018, this 
is in line with the notion that institutions in this 
countries are not from such quality like let say 
North America. The sign on the quality of 
institutions variable is positive in Random effect 
panel models. While the sign on human capital 
variable is positive in all models as expected 
from apriori knowledge.  
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